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This study investigated the effect of corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance on tax 
aggressiveness of listed firms in Nigeria. A cross-sectional research design was utilized for the study, 
and data were collected from the published annual reports. Using a sample of 50 companies for the 
period of 2007 to 2013, the findings of the study reveal that there is a negative relationship between 
CSR performance and tax aggressiveness in Nigeria. A significant relationship was also found between 
firm size and tax aggressiveness, though with mixed positive and negative results. In addition, the 
results reveal a negative and significant relationship between firm performance and tax 
aggressiveness, and the extent of tax aggressiveness is reinforcing. It can be concluded that firms are 
more or less likely to engage in tax aggressiveness depending on their CSR standpoints and dimension 
and other corporate characteristics. It is recommended that more attention should be given by tax 
administrations to understand conditions where tax aggressiveness is more likely and measures 
should be put in place to combat it. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the last three decades, there has been significant 
growth in the investment of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR), both at national and international 
levels. This is because of the effect of corporate 
operations on the health, culture, economic, and social 
life of the communities within which they operate. As a 
result, there has been seriouspublic responses, 
particularly from the human rights agencies, social 
investors and customers demanding organizations, 
especially multinational companies (MNCs) to control and 
prevent the negative effects of their activities on the 
environment (Banerjee, 2010). While business 
organizations around the world are increasingly 
integrating CSR into allaspect of their businesses, critics 
question the legitimacy and value of CSR (Tsoutsoura, 
2004). Some of these studies argue that corporations are 
inefficient and inappropriate agents of social change 
because firms have the sole social responsibility of 
maximizing the value of shareholders (Friedman, 1970; 
Gelb and Stawser, 2001). However, in response to these, 
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Preuss (2010) and Sikka (2010) noted that some firms 
claiming to be socially responsible are also engaged in 
tax aggressive activities. 
Different studies have given different definitions to 
corporate tax aggressiveness. For instance, Chen et al. 
(2010) defines tax aggressiveness as the effort of the 
company to minimize tax payments, using aggressive tax 
planning activities and tax avoidance. Similarly, Frank et 
al. (2009) noted that the aggressive tax returns is the 
arrangement of activities and manipulations to lower tax 
income, this is due to a kind of tax planning that can be 
considered as tax management. This concept may have 
multiple conceptualizations, references and even different 
ways to measure, nonetheless most of them have the 
same meaning and the same purpose but differ in their 
repercussions on the company‘s ‗health‘. Aggressive tax 
represents different handling activities to lower taxable 
income which could be legal or illegal; with the aim of 
maximising income after all corporate settlements.  
This study focuses on examining the relationship 
between tax aggressiveness and CSR performance. 
Particularly, it contributes to exiting literature in three 
ways. Firstly, unlike prior studies on developed 
economies, it provides the first empirical evidence of 
CSR performance on tax aggressiveness in a developing 
economy. The findings reveal that CSR performance has 
a negative relationship with tax aggressiveness. That is, 
socially responsible firms are less likely to engage in tax 
aggressive activities. Secondly, it contributes to the 
literature on firm performance by providing negative 
evidence between performance and tax aggressiveness. 
This suggests that firm performance is a determining 
factor on the use of tax aggressive strategies. Thirdly, 
different methods of calculating tax aggressiveness are 
adopted. From this, depending on the method of tax 
aggressiveness, the firm size may affect tax 
aggressiveness negatively or positively. The evidence 
therefore is mixed.  
 
 
Statement of research problem 
 
Studies have shown that tax aggressiveness can be a 
tax-saving vehicle that cuts costs and increases 
shareholders wealth (Graham and Tucker, 2006; Hanlon 
and Heitzman, 2010; Hanlon and Slemrod, 2009). Some 
other studies suggest that firms that use tax shelters are 
socially irresponsible (Erle, 2008; Schön, 2008; Lanis and 
Richardson, 2012), as the payment of corporate taxes 
helps to ensure the financing of public goods. Thus, a 
corporation‘s tax aggressive policies may have a 
negative effect on the society which could be assumed to 
be socially irresponsible therefore negating previous CSR 
performances (Freedman, 2003; Slemrod, 2004; Landolf, 
2006). Under any of the aforementioned conditions, tax 
decisions are indicative of firm characteristics or 
management    behaviour.     Existing     studies    provide  
 
 
 
 
evidence that CSR policies have an impact on firm 
decisions (Windsor, 2006) and firm performance 
(Brammer and Millington, 2008; Adams and Ferreira, 
2009; Short et al., 2016). CSR is therefore likely to have 
an impact on tax reducing activities.  
Prior research which investigated the link between CSR 
and tax aggressiveness focused on developed 
economies; there is however dearth of research in this 
area for developing countries like Nigeria where the need 
for CSR activities is just beginning to gain significant 
space in corporate domains and academic community is 
largely attributable to the voluntary nature of CSR. 
Majority of the recent studies in CSR research in Nigeria 
are largely focused on CSR reporting and then the 
implications on financial performance. Perspectives on 
the link between CSR and tax aggressive behaviour 
needs attention. Understanding this relationship is 
especially important for a country like Nigeria as the 
largest country in Africa in terms of economy and 
population. The economy is driven largely by natural 
resource and crude oil exploration in particular; and the 
prevalence of social and environmental degradation and 
challenges is no longer news.  
Specifically, the pertinent question being addressed in 
this research is; what is the impact of CSR on corporate 
tax aggressiveness amongst Nigerian listed companies? 
Alongside, the research aims to investigate the effect of 
firm size and firm performance on corporate tax 
aggressiveness.  
 
 
Literature review 
 
Tax aggressiveness 
 
Tax fee is one of the most critical business expenses 
acquired by an organization which has an effect on the 
investors‘ wealth. Given the key goal of maximizing 
shareholder value, firms have monetary motivators to 
embrace tax policies that permit them to lessen their 
duties. As indicated by Sikka (2010) this conduct is seen 
as a typical and rational corporate practice. As such, a 
variety of tax strategies may be used, including some that 
respect the spirit of the law and others that are 
considered aggressive. Chen et al. (2010) describe tax 
aggressiveness as the utilization of tax planning actions 
for downward management of taxable income. These 
activities encompass both activities considered legal and 
illegal (as well as those in the inevitable gray area 
between the two). Chen et al. (2010) suggest that firms 
define their level of tax aggressiveness in view of a 
compromise of the fringe advantages and expenses of 
managing taxes. The marginal benefits essentially 
comprise the tax savings while the negligible expenses 
incorporate those for application (time and effort, 
transaction costs), the possible punishments that can be 
applied by the  tax  authorities, alongside the conceivable  
 
 
 
 
reputation cost and decrease in share price in reaction to 
news of tax offences. 
Building on the accounting and tax literature (Robinson 
and Sikes, 2006; Weaver et al., 2012), different methods 
are utilized to measure a firm‘s tax aggressiveness (Chen 
et al., 2010; Hanlon and Heitzman, 2010; Lanis and 
Richardson, 2012). A popular and generally accepted 
measure of tax aggressiveness (TAG) is the firm‘s 
current effective tax rate (ETR), defined as the current 
income tax expense divided by the pre-tax book income 
(Chen et al., 2010; Lanis and Richardson, 2012). This 
measure involves an expansive scope of tax schemes 
from superbly lawful techniques to assessment evasion. 
For this research, we measure tax aggressiveness by the 
divergent ETR measured using two measures; the 
Hodrick and Prescott (1977) filter and the standard 
deviation of the ETR. 
 
 
Corporate social responsibility 
 
The idea of social responsibility in business has been 
discussed for centuries (Asongu 2007). However, it is 
only recently that academics and other intellectuals have 
joined the conversation, contributing to a growing 
literature of theoretical and empirical work that seeks to 
explain what exactly constitutes good corporate 
citizenship, and what drives corporate behavior in this 
area. In general, most individuals and organizations 
agree that basic legal and ethical standards must be met 
by all businesses. Disagreement arises in deciding how 
far beyond those standards, and at what cost, a firm 
should be expected to go. 
The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is a popular 
framework used by researchers involved in CSR studies. 
The GRI encompasses four major aspects of firm‘s 
performance, economic, environmental, social and 
governance. The standard contains cohesive reporting on 
financial and sustainability outcomes. They emphasize 
that an organization needs to coordinate these areas into 
its procedures to guarantee short and long haul business 
achievement and risk management. GRI also incorporates 
providing details on tax payment. Organizations are 
particularly expected to provide details regarding 
assessment reliefs, tax credits and tax holidays on a 
country basis. The program is centered on reporting and 
does not give direction on standards or other guidance 
for creating substance of tax strategies in connection to 
CSR. It rather recommends different methods in which 
reporting on tax matters is pertinent for firms. For the 
purpose of this study CSR performance will be measured 
in terms of corporate donations carried out during the 
year. 
The existing literature on CSR performance and tax 
aggressiveness has yielded different results. Lanis and 
Richardson (2012) studied the relationship between 
corporate social responsibility  (CSR)  and  corporate  tax  
Mgbame et al.          103 
 
 
 
aggressiveness. Based on a sample of 408 publicly listed 
Australian corporations from 2008 to 2009 financial year, 
the results of their analysis show that the higher the level 
of CSR disclosure of a corporation, the lower is the level 
of corporate tax aggressiveness. The findings showed a 
negative and statistically significant association between 
CSR disclosure and tax aggressiveness, thus they 
opined that more socially responsible corporations are 
likely to be less tax aggressive in nature.  
Hoi et al. (2013) examined the link between corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) and tax avoidance. They used 
a sample of Australian companies and their own ―broad 
based disclosure index‖ for the measurement of CSR. 
From an additional examination, which separates their 
CSR disclosure proxy into different constituents, they 
showed that ―the social investment responsibility and 
corporate CSR policy of a corporation are significant 
components of CSR activities that have a negative 
impact on tax aggressiveness‖. Compared to Lanis and 
Richardson (2012), Hoi et al. (2013) utilized a number of 
measures for tax avoidance using a sample of  76 U.S. 
firms and third-party source to measure CSR activities 
(negative social ratings obtained from KLD Research & 
Analytics, Inc.).  
Linking firm performance with tax aggressiveness, the 
study of Huseynov and Klamm (2012) find evidence that 
the borders between various CSR categories, profit and 
tax fees have an effect on tax avoidance. The results also 
indicate that the firms with strong CSR policies to lower 
cost, not only think about the advantage of the 
shareholders but also for the benefit of society. The firms 
that run into profits have a better position and can easily 
participate in charitable giving. Thus, for such firms it is 
socially acceptable to reduce the tax expense. 
Zimmerman (1983) studied the relationship between firm 
size and tax aggressiveness and finds that the fifty 
largest US firms in his sample experienced higher tax 
rates from 1969 to 1981 and are involved in one tax 
aggressive behavior or the other. Similarly, Rego and 
Wilson (2012) find that equity risk incentives are major 
determinants of tax aggressiveness. Rego (2003) 
examines 19,737 US corporations during 1990 to 1997 
and finds the opposite relationship. On political 
connection, Kim and Zhang (2016) find that politically 
connected firms measured using an array of corporate 
political activities including the employment of connected 
directors, campaign contributions and lobbying, are more 
tax aggressive than non-connected firms due to better 
information on tax laws and lower market pressure for 
transparency. 
 
 
Research hypotheses 
 
In line with the research objectives and from the 
aforementioned discussions, the following hypotheses 
were formulated; 
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1. There is no relationship between CSR performance 
and corporate tax aggressiveness in Nigerian quoted 
companies. 
2. There is no significant relationship between firm size 
and corporate tax aggressiveness in Nigerian quoted 
companies. 
3. There is no significant relationship between firm 
performance and corporate tax aggressiveness in 
Nigerian quoted companies. 
 
 
Theoretical framework 
 
Stakeholder theory 
 
The stakeholder theory assumes that organizations are 
not solely responsible to their immediate shareholders 
but are also responsible to its other stakeholders. 
Accordingly, Freeman (1984) proposes that there are 
several stakeholders of a firm and they are identified 
based on their interests in the firm. As such, stakeholders 
include shareholders, suppliers, customers, employees, 
and even the public. Therefore, firms from this perspective 
are expected to engage in a responsible manner towards 
this group of persons while acknowledging a duty of care. 
Stakeholder theory suggests that the needs of 
shareholders and stakeholders of an organization should 
be met side by side with consideration being given to 
both sides. Hawkins (2006) argues that an inclusive 
stakeholder approach makes it possible for firms to 
maximize their shareholders wealth whilst increasing total 
external value added to the firm. The stakeholder theory 
proposes an integrative social contract between 
externalities to the business and its internal workings. 
Thus, an organization can be seen to be fair towards its 
externals by carrying out activities that advance their 
development and are not seen to be harmful towards this 
group. This includes, refraining from tax aggressive 
behavior or tax avoidance. 
 
 
Institutional theory 
 
Another theory that seeks to explain the basis for 
organisational behaviour in a certain manner is the 
institutional theory or the ‗institutionalist‘ perspective 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995). The theory 
emphasises how different institutional foundations 
accounts for existing and persisting cross-national 
differences in management practices (Child, 2002). A 
central tenet of institutional theory is the belief ‗that 
organisations sharing the same environment will employ 
similar practices and thus become ―isomorphic‖ with each 
other‘ (Kostova and Roth, 2002). DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983) identified three mechanisms through which 
institutional isomorphic change occurs: coercive, mimetic 
and normative isomorphism.  
 
 
 
 
Coercive isomorphism occurs where external agencies 
impose changes on organisations. Mimetic isomorphism 
describes the achievement of conformity through 
imitation of other organisations operating in the same 
organisational field. Normative isomorphism stems 
primarily from professionalization processes within an 
organisational field (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
Following this reasoning, the responsibility to pay taxes 
and the behavior to try to avoid paying taxes can be 
explained especially by mimetic isomorphism as the 
behavior of companies in paying taxes (or trying to avoid 
paying taxes), is generally common among the 
companies of the same industry or operating in the same 
environment.  
 
 
METHODOLOGY  
 
The cross-sectional design was adopted in this study. The total 
population for this study is all listed companies on the Nigerian 
Stock Exchange. The sample consists of firms with complete 
publicly published annual reports for the period of study. This 
amounted to a sample of 50 companies. Data were gathered from 
the annual reports for the period of 2007 to 2013 (7 years). The 
choice of this period is hinged on the availability of financial 
statements and the increase in CSR awareness during this period. 
The dependent variable for the study is tax aggressiveness which 
is measured as the divergent effective tax rate (ETR) (Lanis and 
Richardson, 2012). This divergence will be measured under two 
conditions; using the Hodrick and Prescott (HP) (1997) filter. Using 
this filter (HP), the deviation is thus the difference between the ETR 
smoothened by the statistical filter and the observed value of the 
variable. The second is the standard deviation of the ETR. ETR is 
calculated as: current income tax/pre-tax income. Following prior 
studies (Hategan and Curea-Pitorac, 2017; Liang and Renneboog, 
2017; Amaeshi et al., 2006) the independent variable CSR 
performance is measured as a firm‘s donation for the year. The 
control variables of firm performance and firm size are measured 
using return on asset (ROA) calculated as Annual net income/ 
Average total asset and the natural logarithm of total assets, 
respectively. 
 
 
Model specification 
 
The model is an adaptation and modification of Hanlon and 
Heitzman, (2010), 
  
TAGit = β0 + β1 FMSit + β2 FMPit + β3 CSRPit + εit…………            (2) 
 
Where the functional relationship between the variables are; 
 
TAG = F (FSIZE, FMP and CSRPERF) 
 
The variables are defined as: 
 
TAG = Tax Aggressiveness (Proxied by divergent effective tax rate 
-ETR), 
CSRPERF = corporate social responsibility performance (proxied 
by donations), 
FSIZE = Firm size (proxied by natural logarithm of total assets), 
FMP = Profitability (proxied by return on assets(ROA)), 
εit = error term, 
β0, β1, β2, β3, = coefficients. 
 
A Prior expectation = β0, β1, β2, and β3 >0. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics. 
 
Parameter ROA ETR CSRPERF FSIZE TAG1 TAG2 
Mean 6.042 0.502 1603074. 14.562 -0.391 0.001 
Median 1.406 0.099 101000.0 14.706 -0.023 -0.402 
Maximum 218.496 44.950 1.03E+08 18.416 0.420 44.449 
Minimum -44.791 0.001 1.000 0.000 -44.950 -0.500 
Std. Dev. 17.893 2.894 7320767. 2.354 2.905 2.894 
Jarque-Bera 110776.2 503576.2 205062.1 1943.367 499107.6 503576.2 
Probability 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
 
Note:TAG1 = Tax aggressiveness measured using Hodrick and Prescott (HP) filter. TAG2 = tax aggressiveness measured using 
standard deviation of ETR 
 
 
 
Table 2. Correlation result. 
  
Parameter ROA CSRPERF FSIZE TAG1 TAG2 VIF 
ROA 1     1.017 
CSRPERF 0.117126 1    1.0156 
FSIZE 0.06343 0.04917 1   1.0059 
TAG1 -0.00524 -0.00571 -0.0552 1  - 
TAG2 0.00217 0.00079 0.0629 -0.99899 1 - 
 
Note: TAG1 = Tax aggressiveness measured using Hodrick and Prescott (HP) filter. TAG2 = tax aggressiveness measured 
using standard deviation of ETR. ROA is our proxy for firm performance, CSRPERF is CSR performance, FSIZE is firm size. 
VIF (variance inflation factor) test is a test of multicollinearity amongst variables. 
 
 
 
Presentation and analysis of data 
 
From the descriptive statistics of the variables as shown in Table 1, 
it is observed that ROA has a mean value of 6.042. The maximum 
and minimum values stood at 218.496 and -44.791 respectively. 
The standard deviation measuring the spread of the distribution 
stood at 17.893 which suggest the presence of clustering in values 
of ROA across the sample companies. The mean value for ETR is 
0.5019 with maximum, minimum and standard deviation values of 
44.950, 0.001 and 2.893, respectively. The mean value for 
CSRPERF measured as donations is 1603074 with maximum, 
minimum and standard deviation values of 1.03E+08, 1.0000 and 
7320767, respectively. The mean value for FSIZE measured as the 
log of total assets is 14.56216 with maximum, minimum and 
standard deviation values of 18.41625, 0.000 and 2.354, 
respectively. Tax aggressiveness is measured as the deviation from 
the effective tax rate. This deviation depicting the level of tax 
aggressiveness is computed using two methods; Tax 
aggressiveness computed using the Hodrick and Prescott (HP) 
(1997) filter. Using this filter (HP), the deviation is thus the 
difference between the ETR smoothed by the statistical filter (In 
Eviews8.0) and the observed value of the variable. The estimate of 
tax aggressiveness obtained with this procedure is depicted as 
TAG1. The second estimate of Tax aggressiveness (TAG2) is 
computed as the standard deviation of ETR. For TAG 1, the mean 
is -0.3909 with maximum, minimum and standard deviation values 
of 0.4196, -44.950 and 2.9049, respectively. For TAG2, the mean is 
0.0012 with maximum, minimum and standard deviation values of 
44.449, -0.499 and 2.894, respectively. The Jacque-bera statistics 
with their associated p-values are all less than 0.05, suggesting that 
outliers are unlikely in the distribution. 
Table 2 presents the Pearson correlation coefficient result for the 
variables. However, we focus on the correlation between the 
dependent variable; Tax aggressiveness and corporate 
characteristics  (CSR  performance,  Firm   performance,  and  Firm 
size). As observed, using TAG1, it was found to be negatively 
correlated with ROA (-0.00524), CSRPERF (-0.006) and FSIZE (-
0.0552). Using TAG2, it was found to be positively correlated with 
ROA (0.002), CSRPERF (0.0008) and FSIZE (0.063). The 
correlation results in Table 2 show that none of the variables are 
strongly correlated (r>0.50) and this indicates that the problem of 
multicollinearity is unlikely. However, the variance inflation factor 
test was conducted to further ascertain the collinearity status of the 
variables. Basically, VIFs above 10 are seen as a cause of concern 
(Landau and Everitt, 2003). As observed, none of the variables 
have VIF‘s values exceeding 10 and hence there is no indication of 
multicollinearity. 
Table 3 shows the regression result for the study. The regression 
is conducted using the White Heteroskedasticity-Consistent 
Standard Errors and Covariance to control for possible 
heteroscedasticity in the model. Based on the identification test that 
is, the Hausman‘s Chi-square statistics, (0.032), the fixed effects 
result is preferred and is thus utilized in this study. In addition, the 
fixed effects estimates are better due to the fact that conventional 
ordinary least squares without effects on pooled data would 
estimate a single intercept for all the firms, omitting the 
characteristics that are specific to each firm. Omitting relevant 
unobservable factors would mis-specify the model from the 
econometric standpoint and would inevitably produce biased (or 
inconsistent) OLS estimates.    
Panel A focuses on the effect of the explanatory variables on tax 
aggressiveness computed using the Hodrick and Prescott (HP) 
(1997) filter. As noted earlier, using this filter (HP), the deviation is 
thus the difference between the ETR smoothed by the filter and the 
observed value of the variable. The model shows a coefficient of 
determination (R2) value of 0.325 which suggests that the model 
explains about 32.5% of the systematic variations in the dependent 
variable with an adjusted value of 0.22 controlling for degrees of 
freedom. The F-statistics is 3.166. This is significant at 1% and 
suggests  that   the  hypothesis  of  a  significant  linear  relationship  
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between the dependent and independent variables cannot be 
rejected. It is also indicative of the joint statistical significance of the 
model. The DW statistics of 2.2 indicates the absence of stochastic 
dependence in the model. Commenting on the performance of the 
model‘s coefficients, negative ROA value is negative (-0.0011) and 
statistically significant at 5% level, and this implies that the firm 
financial performance has a negative and significant effect on the 
extent of tax aggressiveness. CSR performance is negative (-
2.29E-09) and significant at 10% level and this implies a negative 
and significant effect on the extent of tax aggressiveness. Firm size 
is negative (-0.0067) though not significant at 10% level and despite 
the non-significance, the sign of the coefficient suggests that the 
bigger the size of the company, the less likely the extent of its tax 
aggressiveness. 
Panel B focuses on the effect of the explanatory variables on tax 
aggressiveness (TAG2) computed using the standard deviation 
from the effective tax rate. The model shows a coefficient of 
determination (R2) value of 0.326 which suggests that the model 
explains about 32.6% of the systematic variations in the dependent 
variable with an adjusted value of 0.223 controlling for degrees of 
freedom. The F-stat of 3.180 is significant at 1% and suggests that 
the hypothesis of a significant linear relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables cannot be rejected. It is also 
indicative of the joint statistical significance of the model. The DW 
statistics of 2.18 indicates the absence of stochastic dependence in 
the model. Commenting on the performance of the model‘s 
coefficients, it is observed that ROA is negative (-0.001) and 
significant at 10% level. This implies that the firm performance has 
a negative and significant effect on the tax aggressiveness. CSR 
performance (CSRPERF) is negative (-2.37E-09) and significant at 
10% level and this implies that the higher the level of CSR 
performance, the lower the extent of tax aggressiveness. Firm size 
is positive (0.009) and significant at 1% level indicating that the 
bigger the company, the higher the extent of its tax aggressiveness. 
Panel C is a dynamic model that incorporates the effect of one-
period TAG1 into the model. The model shows a coefficient of 
determination (R2) value of 0.362 which suggest that the dynamic 
model explains about 36.2% of the systematic variations in the 
dependent variable with an adjusted value of 0.246 controlling for 
degrees of freedom. The F-statistics of 3.105 is significant at 1% 
and suggests that the hypothesis of a significant linear relationship 
between the dependent and independent variables cannot be 
rejected. It is also indicative of the joint statistical significance of the 
model. The DW statistics of 2.02 indicates the absence of 
stochastic dependence in the model. Commenting on the 
performance of the model‘s coefficients, it is observed that ROA is 
negative (-0.0009) and significant at 1% level and this implies that 
firms not performing well may be more tax aggressive. CSR 
performance (CSRPERF) is negative (-2.37E-09) and significant at 
1% level and this implies that the higher the level of CSR 
performance, the lower the extent of tax aggressiveness. Firm size 
is negative in this case (-0.007) and significant at 1% level. The 
effect of one-period log of TAG1 is negative (0.138) and significant 
which implies that tax aggressiveness appears to be reinforcing 
such that previous level aggressiveness affects current extent of 
aggressiveness.  
Panel D is also a dynamic model that incorporates the effect of 
one-period lag of TAG2 into the model. The model shows a 
coefficient of determination (R2) value of 0.363 which suggests that 
the model explains about 36.3% of the systematic variations in the 
dependent variable with an adjusted value of 0.247 controlling for 
degrees of freedom. The F-statistics of 3.121 is significant at 5% 
and suggests that the hypothesis of a significant linear relationship 
between the dependent and independent variables cannot be 
rejected. It is also indicative of the joint statistical significance of the 
model. The DW statistics of 2.03 indicates the absence of 
stochastic dependence in the model. Commenting on the 
performance of the model‘s coefficients, it is observed  that  ROA  is  
 
 
 
 
negative (-0.007) and significant at 1% level and this implies that 
firms not performing well may be more tax aggressive. CSR 
performance (CSRPERF) is negative (-2.32E-09) and significant at 
1% level and this implies that the higher the level of CSR 
performance, the lower the extent of tax aggressiveness. Firm size 
is positive in this case (0.0102) and significant at 10% level. The 
effect of one-period log of TAG2 is positive (0.1416) and significant 
which implies that tax aggressiveness appears to be reinforcing 
such that previous level aggressiveness affects current extent of 
aggressiveness.  
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
 
Corporate social responsibility performance and tax 
aggressiveness 
 
The regression result in Table 3 shows that corporate 
social performance is negative and statistically significant 
at 5% level and this implies that the higher the level of 
CSR performance, the lower the extent of tax 
aggressiveness. The results are also robust across the 
measures of aggressiveness used that is, tax 
aggressiveness measured using Hodrick and Prescott 
(HP) filter and using standard deviation of ETR. 
Consequently, the alternative hypothesis of a negative 
significant relationship between CSR performance and 
tax aggressiveness is accepted. Thus, firms engaged in 
CSR are probably less tax aggressive because of their 
need to convey transparency, integrity, and a good 
reputation. The finding is in tandem with Lanis and 
Richardson (2012) as they find that more socially 
responsible Australian firms are less tax aggressive. 
Similarly, Muller and Kolk (2015) using Indian sample 
discovered that multinational enterprise subsidiaries with 
good CSR reputation pay higher effective tax rates. 
Matthew (2014) using a sample of U.S. firms for the 
period 2009 to 2011 discovered that companies with a 
higher level of business ethics are likely to be less tax 
aggressive. Lanis and Richardson (2013) found a positive 
and statistically significant association between corporate 
tax aggressiveness and CSR disclosure. However, 
studies of some other researchers such as Carroll and 
Joulfaian (2005), Preuss (2010) and Sikka (2010) argued 
that even though some firms claim to be socially 
responsible, they also indulge in tax avoidance. 
 
 
Firm size and tax aggressiveness  
 
The existing empirical evidence on the relationship 
between firm size and tax aggressiveness is mixed. On 
one hand, political power theory (Salamon and Siegfried, 
1977) argues that firm size and tax aggressiveness are 
negatively correlated. On the other hand, political cost 
theory (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986) proposes that 
larger firms pay higher taxes. Consequently, Wilkie and 
Limberg (1990) and Kern and Morris (1992) argue that 
these  variances   can  be  credited  to  the  different  time  
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Table 3. Regression Result. 
 
Variable 
Panel A Panel B Panel C Panel D 
TAG 1 TAG 2 DYN-TAG1 DYN-TAG2 
C -0.294*** (0.0621) -1.131** (0.0550) -0.385*** (0.092) -0.048 (0.094) 
ROA -0.0011** (0.000) -0.001* (0.000) -0.0009*** (0.000) -0.007*** (0.000) 
CSRPERF -2.29E-09*** (2.87E-10) -2.37E-09*** (2.47E-10) -2.37E-09*** (8.19E-10) -2.32E-09*** (7.64E-10) 
FIRMSIZE -0.007 (0.004) 0.009*** (0.004) -0.007*** (0.006) 0.0102* (0.006) 
TAG1(-1)   0.138*** (0.050)  
TAG2(-1)    0.142*** (0.047) 
R
2
 0.325 0.326 0.362 0.363 
Adjusted R
2
 0.222 0.223 0.246 0.247 
D.W 2.2 2.18 2.02 2.03 
Mean of Dep.Var  -0.829 -4.270 -0.970 -3.765 
S.E of Regression 2.432 2.433 2.440 2.438 
F-stat 3.166 (0.00) 3.180 (0.00) 3.105 (0.00) 3.121 (0.00) 
 
Note:TAG1 = Tax aggressiveness measured using Hodrick and Prescott (HP) filter. TAG2 = tax aggressiveness measured using standard 
deviation of ETR. ROA is our proxy for firm performance, CSRPERF is CSR performance, FSIZE is firm size. *, ** and *** represent statistical 
significance at10%, 5 % and 1% level respectively. Roust standard errors are in parenthesis. 
 
 
 
periods used in each study. Gupta and Newberry (1997) 
also affirm that the varying results suggest that firm-size 
effects could be sample-specific and not likely to exist 
over time in corporations with longer histories. The 
present results appear to depict these mixed findings 
already existent in extant literature as firm size appears 
to be positive using TAG1 and negative using TAG2. 
Nevertheless, the variables appear statistically significant. 
Therefore, we fail to accept the null hypothesis of no 
significant relationship between firm size and tax 
aggressiveness. Stickney and McGee (1982) did not find 
any significant relationships between tax aggressiveness 
and firm size. Phillips (2003) found no significant relation 
between firm size and tax aggressiveness. Kim and 
Limpaphayom (1998) examined the relation between tax 
aggressiveness and firm size in Hong Kong, Korea, 
Malaysia, Taiwan and Thailand. They found different 
relationships between firm size and tax aggressiveness in 
different regions and/or different study periods.  
 
 
Firm performance and tax aggressiveness 
 
Commenting on the performance of the model‘s 
coefficients, it was observed that ROA is negative and 
significant and it is robust across measures of tax 
aggressiveness used that is, using TAG1 and TAG2. The 
results suggest that firms not performing well may be 
more tax aggressive. Consequently, the alternative 
hypothesis of a negative significant relationship between 
financial performance and tax aggressiveness is 
accepted. Providing the justification for the results, Sikka 
(2010) proposes that tax avoidance is a tax saving 
vehicle, which reduces costs and increases profit as well 
as the wealth  of  shareholders.  Thus,  companies  doing 
badly financially may resort to tax aggressive strategies 
to create a lee-way to smooth earnings and improve their 
profitability numbers.   
 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
Corporate social responsibility performance-tax 
aggressiveness nexus is clearly an area that has not 
received any serious attention from researchers in this 
part of the world. However, it has become one of the 
emerging contemporary extensions of CSR research. 
The reasoning behind the causal effects of CSR 
performance on tax aggressiveness, defined as effort of 
the company to minimize tax payments using aggressive 
tax planning activities, is that firms may engage in tax 
aggressiveness depending on the CSR dimension they 
have developed. Using a survey design technique and 
fifty companies listed on the Nigerian stock exchange 
from 2007 to 2013, the research findings reveal that there 
is a significant relationship between corporate social 
responsibility and corporate tax aggressiveness, there is 
a significant relationship between financial performance, 
firm size and corporate tax aggressiveness. Finally, the 
extent of tax aggressiveness appears to be reinforcing 
such that previous level aggressiveness affects current 
extent of aggressiveness. The present study recommends 
that there is the need for tax authorities to effectively 
monitor tax trend of companies and to ensure that tax 
avoidance and aggressiveness schemes are not 
developed using CSR performance activities.   
Like every other research, the study is not without its 
limitations. Donations have been utilized as a proxy for 
CSR activity. As noted by Amaeshi et al. (2006), CSR 
should  reflect  the  culture and needs of the country. This 
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dimension therefore appears to be disclosed by most 
listed companies in Nigeria. It may however not suffice as 
a robust proxy for developed economies. Future research 
can investigate a comparative analysis between different 
dimensions of CSR. Again, the use of HP filter and the 
standard deviation of ETR has been criticised by some 
studies. Future research can incorporate other measures 
for tax aggressiveness. These limitations do not 
undermine the validity of the results. They should serve 
as building blocks for new research.   
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